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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of parental leave – both own and spousal – on subse-
quent earnings using different sources of variation. Using fixed-effect models, and in 
line with previous results, parental leave is found to decrease each parent’s future earn-
ings. Also spousal leave is important, but only for mothers. In fact, each month the fa-
ther stays on parental leave has a larger positive effect on maternal earnings than a sim-
ilar reduction in the mother’s own leave. Using two reforms of the parental leave system 
as exogenous sources of variation yields only imprecisely estimated effects, even 
though the reforms had a strong effect on parental leave usage. However, the point es-
timates tentatively suggest effects in the same range or larger than the fixed-effects 
model found. 
Keywords: parental leave, gender equality, earnings 
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1  Introduction 
The last decades have seen a convergence in the labor market behavior of males and 
females, where the male-to-female ratio of educational levels, participation rates, hours 
worked and hourly earnings have declined (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007; Lundberg, 
2005). Despite this, females continue to take the lion’s share of housework, child 
minding and parental leave (Evertsson and Nermo, 2007; Gershuny and Robinson, 
1988; Halleröd, 2005; Lundberg and Pollak, 2007), and it is sometimes argued that this 
is one potential explanation for the remaining, unexplained earnings gap (Datta Gupta et 
al, 2008; Lundberg and Pollak, 2007). For example, being on parental leave for young 
children may reduce future earnings through a number of channels such as human capi-
tal losses during the absence period or signaling effects (Albrecht et al, 1999; Mincer, 
1974; Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Stafford and Sundström, 
1996). 
An additional mechanism, generally ignored in previous work, is the effect via future 
division of intra-household labor and child care. If parental leave today affects child 
care and household labor tomorrow, also spousal parental leave may be an important 
determinant of future earnings. For example, if a fathers’ parental leave helps him ac-
quire skills useful for taking care of children, this may affect future division of house-
work and child care within the family, and hence feed back onto maternal labor market 
behavior. This paper investigates the effect of parental leave on earnings.
1
                                                 
1 The present study also serves to evaluate the Swedish daddy month reform. The main goals of the Swedish parental 
leave system are, as described in a government bill from 1993, gender equality, the child’s right to both parents, child 
development and equal opportunity for both males and females to combine parenthood with a career (The Swedish 
Government, 1994). To my knowledge, there are no studies on how the daddy month affected parental labor market 
behavior. 
 It fits into a 
broader literature on the effects of career interruptions on earnings. However, the 
present paper departs from previous studies in several ways. First, it explicitly investi-
gates the effect of not only own, but also spousal parental leave, an issue generally ig-
nored in previous work. Second, it utilizes several sources of variation to identify ef-
fects. Besides cross sectional (CS) and fixed-effects (FE) models, it utilizes two policy  4  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
reforms of the Swedish parental leave system that produced arguably exogenous varia-
tion in parental leave. The reforms reserved one and two months of leave for each 
spouse, which in practice decreased mothers’ leave (the first reform) and increased fa-
thers’ leave (both reforms). Since the new rules applied to parents with children born 
after certain dates, the effect of reform exposure can be estimated using a difference in 
differences (DD) or triple differences (DDD) strategy. Finally, the register-based data 
set encompasses the entire Swedish population and is virtually free from missing-
variables problems, attrition and self-report errors. 
Previous studies have mostly found negative effects on earnings of absence in gen-
eral and parental leave in particular (see for example Albrecht et al, 1999; Datta Gupta 
and Smith, 2002; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Görlich and De Grip, 2009; Mincer, 1974; 
Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Ruhm, 1998; Skyt Nielsen, 2009). 
In general, regression adjustment approaches are used for identification, sometimes with 
fixed effects to control for unobserved but time-invariant heterogeneity (Skyt Nielsen, 
2009, is an exception using a reform of parental leave schemes among Danish publicly 
employed as exogenous variation). Regarding the effect of spousal parental leave, this 
issue is mostly ignored (one exception is Pylkkänen and Smith, 2003, who find that an 
increased parental leave period for fathers (“fathers’ quota”) reduces the job absence 
time of mothers, even when the days available for mothers are left unchanged). How-
ever, there are indications that early paternal involvement in childcare has effects on 
their involvement also later on. For example, Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007) find 
that fathers who take longer leave in connection to the birth of the child are more in-
volved in child-caring activities 9 months later. On the other hand, Ekberg et al (2004) 
find no effects of ordinary parental leave on later care for sick children. 
This paper shows that both own and spousal parental leave is potentially important 
for future earnings. Using the fixed effects model to control for unobserved but time-
constant heterogeneity, the results show that each parent’s own leave has a significant 
and negative effect on own future earnings. However, and more interesting, also spousal 
leave is important, but only for mothers. Each month the father stays on parental leave 
has a larger positive effect on maternal earnings than a similar reduction in the mother’s 
own leave. Using the reforms as exogenous variation in parental leave yields imprecise IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  5 
estimates, despite the fact that both reforms strongly affected parental leave usage. 
However, the point estimates tentatively suggest larger effects than what was found us-
ing the fixed effects model. 
2  The Swedish parental leave system and the 
reforms 
The modern Swedish parental leave system was introduced in 1974, when both parents 
were given equal rights to use the system. It consists of several parts, the most important 
one being the governmentally paid cash benefit for parents staying home to care for 
their child. Most days (360 or 390, depending on child birth date) are reimbursed as a 
percentage of the previous wage, while a smaller amount of days (90) are reimbursed on 
a low flat rate. For individuals without the required previous labor market attachment, 
all days are replaced on a fixed (low) flat rate. The number of days on cash benefits as 
well as the reimbursement level has varied slightly over time; see Appendix for more 
details. There is great flexibility in the parental leave cash benefits; they can be used 
until the child turns eight years old and the parents can also choose to stay home part-
time. The leave is also job protected. For more information on the Swedish parental 
leave system, see Berggren (2005), Duvander et. al. (2005) or The Swedish Social In-
surance Agency (2002). 
The overwhelming majority of parental leave is taken by mothers (Batljan et al, 
2004). To increase the fathers’ take up of parental leave benefits, two so called “daddy 
months” were introduced, the first in 1995 and the second in 2002. Before 1995, each 
parent were given half of the cash benefits days, but were free to transfer days to each 
other. But for those with children born from the 1
st of January, 1995, 30 days of cash 
benefits are set aside for each parent and cannot be transferred. If those days are not 
used, they are simply lost. The 1
st of January, 2002, an additional daddy month was in-
troduced, making 60 days non-transferable. An important difference between the re-
forms is that in 1995, the total number of days was held constant, which meant that in 
practice mothers lost one month of parental leave. In 2002, the total number of days in-
creased by one month so that mothers’ maximum number of days was left unchanged. 6  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
It is important to note that the new rules apply according to the birth date of the child. 
There are also other changes in the parental leave system and in the social insurance 
system in general imposed from the 1
st of January 1995 and the 1
st of January 2002, but 
they generally apply equally to all individuals regardless of child birth dates. Hence, 
they affect both treatment (born after the turn of the year) and control (born after the 
turn of the year) groups equally. There are, however, some exceptions. The reimburse-
ment rate was lowered from 90 to 80 percent in 1995. Although this affected all families 
equally in the long run, parents with children born before 1995 were given a respite and 
could keep their previous, higher replacement rate until the end of 1996. However, the 
30 days set aside for each parent were excluded from this change and still replaced as 90 
percent of previous wage. In 2002, the reimbursement rate for the flat rate days was 
doubled and this only applied to children born after 1
st of January, 2002. 
The daddy month legislation applies only to parents with shared custody of the child. 
Married parents are automatically given shared custody, while non-married parents 
must apply for shared custody. However, the overwhelming majority of families have 
shared custody. Within our sample (described below) 93 percent of all children had co-
habiting parents at the time they turned one, and among cohabiting parents shared cus-
tody is very common. For example, 96 percent of all cohabiting parents of 1-5 year old 
children had shared custody in 1999 (Statistics Sweden, 2000). In the data, there is no 
information on custodial arrangements. 
3  Identification 
Theoretically, career interruptions and parental leave could affect an individual’s own 
future earnings through three main channels. First is the effect via decreased market 
human capital (Mincer, 1974; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). This loss in market human cap-
ital may arise for different reasons such as a) forgone experience, b) skill depreciation 
during the leave, and c) effects ex ante via sorting into different types of jobs because of 
anticipated future career interruptions (Gronau, 1988). Second, career interruptions may 
work as a negative signal of work commitment (Albrecht et al, 1999; Datta Gupta and IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  7 
Smith, 2002). Third, there may be statistical discrimination against high absence groups 
(Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Spence, 1973). 
In addition, it is possible that not only the individuals’ own but also spousal parental 
leave affects earnings. This possibility has generally been ignored in previous work. If 
we consider a standard model for intra-family division of labor, it implies that increas-
ing returns to specialization, along with (possibly small) initial differences in (different 
types of) human capital endowments will induce females to at least partly specialize in 
home production and males in market work. This in turn lowers female annual earnings 
primarily via the direct effect on hours worked, but also via the effect on hourly earn-
ings, as housework is assumed to lower hourly earnings through different channels (less 
effort left for work, less experience and human capital accumulation when working 
part-time or because of periods of job absence
2
In the following, we focus on the effect of parental leave on mothers’ earnings in a 
setting with panel data on families with their first child born in December or January 
around the reform cutoff or one year earlier.
) (Albrecht et al., 1999; Becker, 1991; 
Datta Gupta et al, 2008; Lundberg, 2005: Lundberg and Pollak, 2007, Mincer and Ofek, 
1982; Stafford and Sundström, 1996). If the division of parental leave affects spousal 
relative human capital endowments, it could also affect earnings. For example, fathers 
on parental leave could acquire child care human capital if the parental leave implies a 
period of learning to take care of a child (this is especially likely if we focus on the first-
born child) making him more likely to take part of child care also in the future, which in 
turn could feed back to mothers’ labor market behavior. 
3
itcm i mt m t c itcm itcm itcm e FPL f MPL m E + + + + + + + + = a a a a a b
0 0 0 ln
 Each family is observed twice, one year 
before birth and four years later. A flexible structural model for the effect of parental 
leave on mothers’ earnings may be written 
 
where the subscripts denotes family (i), time in terms of (approximate) child age (t=0 or 
t=4), cohort group (c=1 if the child is born around the reform cutoff) and month-of-birth 
(m=1 if born in January). 
                                                 
2 Empirical support for this hypothesis is found in Hersch and Stratton (1994, 1997, 2000). 
3 Models for fathers’ earnings may be written in an equal fashion but since the parameters may differ by gender the 
models need to be estimated separately for mothers and fathers. 8  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
The dependent variable measures log earnings, MPL and FPL measures the mother’s 
and the father’s cumulative parental leave and the α:s denotes time (αt), cohort (αc), 
month-of-birth (αm) and family (αi) fixed effects. The interaction term αmt allows the ef-
fect on earnings to vary between children born in December or January over time. This 
is potentially important, since we measure outcomes at the end of each calendar year. 
This means that children born in January are, by construction, on average one month 
younger when outcomes are measured than children born in December (remember that t 
denoted average child age; at t=4 children born in December are on average 4 years and 
0.5 month old while children born in January are on average 3 years and 11.5 months 
old). This could imply that parents of January-born children are less likely to work or to 
work full-time and that those who do work are drawn slightly more from the upper end 
of the income distribution (the idea being that the reservation wage is higher, the 
younger the child is). This effect is also likely to vary over time – before birth (t=0) it is 
likely zero, while if we looked at t=1 it could be a sizeable effect and at t=4 it is proba-
bly smaller but perhaps not zero. Another example, which might produce systematic 
differences for parents of children born around the turn of the year, relates to the school 
starting age legislation. When children reach school starting age, there is a cutoff at the 
turn of the year, making children in the control group start school one year earlier than 
children in the treatment group which in turn could affect parent’s labor market beha-
vior
4
Since the family fixed effects are unobserved, we may rewrite vitcm= αi +eitcm i.e. re-
place the error term and the family fixed effect with the composite error term vitcm. For 
ease of exposition, control variables are omitted but can easily be added to the model. 
For simplicity we also disregard the fact that the number of parental leave days may 
enter nonlinearly; the intuition still holds for the more general case. Naturally, we would 
expect |m|>|f|, i.e that a mother’s own parental leave have a larger effect on earnings 
. However, this is probably a small concern since we measure outcomes for child-
ren below school starting age. 
                                                 
4 In Sweden, the mandatory school starting time is in August the calendar year when the child turns seven years old. 
One year earlier all children are offered to participate in a voluntary pre-school class during some hours each day. 
The pre-school classes are  intended as a bridge between ordinary preschool and compulsory school (Swedish 
National Agency for School Improvement, 2007). IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  9 
than spousal parental leave. Previous research has generally ignored the spousal effects. 
However, here we have the explicit aim to estimate also the effect of spousal parental 
leave on own earnings. 
First, if we only had cross-sectional data at t=4 the model would reduce to a standard 
cross-sectional (CS) model, 
icm i m c icm icm icm e FPL f MPL m E + + + + + + = a a a b
1 1 1 ln   (1) 
which is consistently estimated by ordinary least squares as long as vicm=αi+eicm is un-
correlated with MPL and FPL. This assumption is unlikely to hold. For example, if par-
ents who take more (less) parental leave also are less (more) career oriented and for that 
reason have lower (higher) earnings, this assumption is clearly violated. These differ-
ences in preferences for children versus market work may be difficult to proxy by in-
cluding standard control variables and the resulting estimates will reflect selection ra-
ther than causal effects. In such case, the estimates will be biased downwards. Another 
possible story, potentially most applicable for fathers, is that fathers on leave – i.e. “re-
sponsible fathers” –are fathers with high earnings capacity. This interpretation is similar 
to the male marital wage premium found in earlier literature, where married men and/or 
fathers have higher earnings than non-married/non-fathers (Datta Gupta et. al, 2007; 
Gray, 1997). This story would lead to an upward biased estimate of the effect of paren-
tal leave on earnings among fathers. 
Previous studies have used individual/family fixed effects to control for unobserved 
but time-invariant heterogeneity. If the endogenous variables – such as family prefe-
rences or “responsibility” – are constant over time, this approach yields unbiased esti-
mates. Given our panel data, we can estimate a dummy-variable fixed effects (FE) 
model, 
itcm i m t c itcm itcm itcm e FPL f MPL m E + + + + + + + = a a a a b
2 2 2 ln   (2) 
where we have assumed that αmt=0.
5
                                                 
5 Of course, we cannot distinguish between the different time-constant fixed effects, αc,αm and αi, they are estimated 
simultaneously. 
 Note that MPL and FPL are always zero before 
birth so the main difference from model (1) above is that the dependent variable is 
measured as first differences. Now, the family unobserved effect can be controlled for 10  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
so this model is consistently estimated by OLS under the weaker assumption 
E[Xitcm*∆eitcm]=0, where X=MPL, FPL. In particular, the model allows for fixed family 
characteristics that are correlated with the dependent and independent variables. 
However, to the extent that fertility (number, timing and spacing of children) is en-
dogenous,  also fixed-effects models may yield biased estimates (Browning, 1992; 
Lundberg, 2005). This could happen if, for example, fertility and/or parental leave re-
spond to income shocks. If so, we need some kind of exogenous variation in parental 
leave to identify causal effects. This paper utilizes the daddy-month reforms as such 
plausibly exogenous variation and compares children born just around the reform cu-
toffs. If we continue to assume αmt=0 – i e. that there are no time-varying systematic dif-
ferences between children born in December and January - we may restrict focus to 
children born around the reform cutoff only (and exclude families with children born 
the preceding year). Then a difference-in-differences (DD) model is given by 
itm i m t itm itm e rREFORM E + + + + + = a a a b
3 ln   (3) 
where REFORM is an indicator variable for being exposed to the reform. Note that this 
variable is exactly the same as the interaction term between month-of-birth and time, 
αmt, from above. This is why we need the αmt=0 assumption to hold in order for the 
REFORM coefficient to measure the effect of the reform (rather than the effect of dif-
ferences between children born in December and January). If there are no such differ-
ences between children born in December and January, this model is consistently esti-
mated by OLS as long as E[REFORMitm*eitm]=0. In particular, exposure to the reform 
should be exogenous and uncorrelated with for example income shocks. This specifica-
tion identifies the intention to treat (ITT) effect – the effect of the reform on all families 
regardless of whether they comply or not – and as such, it mat be viewed as giving a 
lower bound on the “true” effect of a month increase/decrease in parental leave for fa-
thers/mothers. In the absence of extra control variables, the reform coefficient equals the 
difference between different group means, see Table 1. 
If there are normal-year systematic differences between children born in December 
and January (αtm≠0), for example because children in the group exposed to the reform 
are slightly younger when earnings are measured, we would need to include also fami-IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  11 
lies from a comparison year and estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) model, 
itcm i ct mt m t c itcm itcm e REFORM r E + + + + + + + + = a a a a a a b ' ln
4   (4) 
where REFORM=αctm now is an indicator for children born in January during reform 
year at time t=4 (for completeness also the second “baseline” interaction effect αct is 
added to the model). In the absence of control variables, also this REFORM coefficient 
is given as a difference between group means; see Table 1 below. 
Table 1 DD and DDD estimates 
 
Comparison group  
(child born one year before reform cutoff) 
Reform group  
(child born around reform cutoff) 
Child’s month of 
birth  December  January  December  January 
lnE at t=0  a’  b’  a  b 
lnE at t=4  c’  d’  c  d 
Difference  c’-a’  d’-b’  c-a  d-b 
DD estimate  (d’-b’)-(c’-a’)  (d-b)-(c-a) 
DDD estimate  [(d-b)-(c-a)]-[ (d’-b’)-(c’-a’)] 
 
The models using the reforms as exogenous sources of variation (eq. 3-4) identifies 
the joint effect of MPL and FPL for the first reform, and the effect of FPL for the 
second reform. Remember that the second reform affected only fathers’ parental leave 
while holding mothers’ available parental leave days constant. In contrast, the first 
reform affected both parents’ leave; given that mothers before the reform used virtually 
all parental leave, MPL was reduced by one month, while FPL was increased by a sim-
ilar amount for the compliers. 
Using the first reform, and without further assumptions about the parameters (m and f) we 
cannot identify whether the effect runs through own or spousal uptake of parental leave; we 
have only one instrument and two endogenous variables. But since we have two reforms, it is, in 
principle, possible to calculate instrumental variables estimates of the effect of each parent’s pa-
rental leave (rather than the “reduced form” reform effects). However, such a strategy requires 
that there are no structural changes over time and since it is seven years between the first and 
second reform, this assumption may be questioned. We may also note that by using the re-
forms as exogenous variation and comparing families around the reform cutoffs our 
identification strategy isolates the direct and individual-level effect of parental leave on 
earnings. In particular, the estimated effect does not include long-term equilibrium ef-12  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
fects, such as statistical discrimination, sorting into different types of job because of an-
ticipated future job absence, or increased female investments in market human capital 
due to changed expectations of a future partner’s share of housework. 
For simplicity the discussion above did not include control variables. Given ex-
ogeneity of treatment status, control variables X are unnecessary; the inclusion of con-
trol variables may, however, increase precision and is also an informal way of testing 
exogeneity. Note, however, that the control variables are always measured prior to the 
child’s birth and never in first differences even in the fixed-effects or DD/DDD models. 
(In the standard fixed-effects setting, non-variant control variables drop out; however, 
assuming that predetermined control variables can have different impact at different 
times/child ages allows us to include interactions between time and the pre-determined 
control variables.
6
In the estimations, parental leave is measured only up to child age three (instead of 
four). The reason is that the outcome is annual earnings (as compared to wages or 
hourly earnings) and the prime purpose is to investigate the long-term effects of pre-
vious leave on future earnings (and not the obvious and immediate effect of parental 
leave today on earnings today). See Section A2 in Appendix for more details on the 
timing of variable collection. 
 ) 
As usual in earnings regressions, the problem of zeroes due to non-participation 
arises since we only observe earnings for individuals who participate in the labor mar-
ket. Different processes may be at work on the extensive and intensive margin, and in-
cluding observations with value zero and using a linear estimation model may induce 
specification bias due to nonlinearity. Focusing on individuals who do work necessarily 
implies conditioning on an endogenous variable which yields a selected sample of par-
ticipants (Wooldridge, 2002). Throughout the paper OLS is used on log annual earnings 
in SEK+1 to include also non-participants but results on the participation decision as 
well as results for the participants only are shown in the Appendix. 
                                                 
6 Note that we never want to include control variables measured at t=4 since they may be affected by treatment and as 
such are part of the outcome. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  13 
4  Data 
This section describes the data. It also describes how the reforms affected parental leave 
usage and discusses issues of exogeneity. 
4.1  Data and estimation 
The panel data set is based on register information (created by combining the LISA data 
base and the so called multigenerational registry, provided by Statistics Sweden, with 
data on parental leave provided by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency) encompassing 
the entire Swedish population. It contains high-quality, individual level information on 
all children and their family members, including information on annual earnings (from 
the tax registers), parental leave usage and standard covariates such as age, educational 
levels and marital status. There is in principle no attrition or missing variables problem. 
The samples consist of native Swedish families
7 whose first child
8
The dependent variable measures log annual earnings (in SEK + 1 to include zero-
earners). The (possibly endogenous) independent variables of interest are the mother’s 
and father’s total parental leave up to child age three. These are measured in days in the 
descriptive section to give a precise picture of how the reforms affected parental leave, 
but for readability they are rescaled to months (by dividing by 30) in the regressions. 
These variables are used in models (1) and (2). The exogenous reform indicator, used in  
 was born one 
month before or after each reform cutoff or the preceding year. Families whose first 
birth was a multiple birth (approximately 3 percent) are excluded since the parental 
leave rules for these families are slightly different. This leaves us with 9007 families for 
the first reform sample and 8301 families for the second reform sample. In the main 
analysis, most variables are observed both one year prior to the child’s birth (t=0) and 
when the child is on average four years old (t=4); see Section 3 above and Section A2 in 
Appendix for more details on the timing of data collection. 
                                                 
7  For immigrants, there are around 20% missing observation due to lack of educational information. However, 
including immigrants in the estimations does not change the results.  
8 Only children who are both parents first-born child are included to avoid bias from previous children and their 
parental leave days. 14  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
models (3) and (4), is 1 for children born in January 1995 (first reform sample) or Janu-
ary 2002 (second reform sample) and 0 for all other children. The models also include 
the other indicator variables mentioned in Section 3 (cohort, month-of-birth, time and 
their interactions). A number of control variables are also available, including parental 
age and educational levels, marital status and child gender. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the samples. There are relatively small differ-
ences in terms of control variables both between comparison and reform periods and 
between children born in December and January. Most individuals have either a high 
school degree (around 60 percent) or a university degree (almost 30 percent). Fathers 
are older and have higher earnings than the mothers. A relatively small proportion (20 
percent) is married and this is explained by the fact that marital status is measured one 
year prior to the child’s birth. 
Regarding parental leave, the reforms seem to have had a strong effect. The first 
reform decreased mothers’ leave by around one month (27.8 days) and increased fa-
thers’ leave by almost 8 days. This is in clear contrast to the comparison period, where 
the number of parental leave days is quite similar for children born in December and 
January; slightly fewer days have been used for children born in January and that is 
probably because of the small difference in age. The second reform is associated with a 
decrease in mothers’ leave by 10 days; however, in the comparison period mothers’ 
days decreased by even more (14 days), which again suggests that this is due to the fact 
that children born in January are slightly younger than December-born children when 
parental leave is measured. Fathers’ parental leave increased by 9 days after the second 
reform, while it remained virtually unchanged during the comparison period. These 
reform effects are slightly smaller than the ones estimated by Ekberg et al. (2005) and 
the reason is our focus on parental leave during the child’s first three years of life. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  15 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the samples 
  Comparison cohort  Reform cohort 
 
 
Panel a) First reform sample 
Dec93  Jan94  Dec94  Jan95 
Mother's earnings  117.8  118.8  112.5  111.3 
(thousands SEK)  (63.2)  (64.2)  (71.1)  (71.5) 
Father's earnings  143.8  145.9  140.7  142.1 
(thousands SEK)  (89.5)  (93.3)  (105.3)  (101.0) 
Mother’s PL (days)  460.4  457.8  467.1  439.3 
  (160.6)  (154.6)  (159.7)  (152.5) 
Father’s PL (days)  50.1  47.5  40.4  47.9 
  (69.4)  (69.7)  (71.2)  (62.0) 
Mother's age  25.6  25.6  25.6  25.5 
  (4.55)  (4.40)  (4.43)  (4.42) 
Father's age  27.7  27.6  27.8  27.7 
  (4.96)  (4.98)  (4.94)  (4.85) 
Mother w. high school educ.  0.60  0.59  0.59  0.61 
Father w. high school educ.  0.58  0.60  0.60  0.58 
Mother w. university educ.  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.28 
Father w. university educ.  0.27  0.26  0.27  0.28 
Married  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.18 
Son  0.51  0.51  0.53  0.51 
N  2135  2520  2115  2237 
 
 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
Dec00  Jan01  Dec01  Jan02 
Mother's earnings   155.3  155.8  170.0  170.4 
(thousands SEK)  (95.1)  (99.4)  (104.5)  (105.7) 
Father's earnings  205.4  209.3  226.9  222.1 
(thousands SEK)  (128.4)  (134.4)  (176.7)  (168.1) 
Mother’s PL (days)  408.1  394.4  405.3  395.2 
  (142.5)  (142.6)  (146.9)  (138.8) 
Father’s PL (days)  56.6  57.3  62.5  71.6 
  (69.2)  (68.5)  (67.9)  (69.7) 
Mother's age  26.8  26.9  27.3  27.0 
  (4.50)  (4.58)  (4.71)  (4.55) 
Father's age  28.9  28.9  29.2  28.8 
  (5.01)  (4.92)  (5.04)  (4.97) 
Mother w. high school educ.  0.50  0.48  0.54  0.56 
Father w. high school educ.  0.54  0.53  0.66  0.64 
Mother w. university educ.  0.38  0.40  0.38  0.36 
Father w. university educ.  0.34  0.35  0.24  0.26 
Married  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.18 
Son  0.53  0.52  0.53  0.51 
N  1848  2174  1944  2335 
Notes: All variables except the parental leave variables and child gender are measured one year prior to the child’s 
birth. Earnings are measured in thousands SEK, including zeroes. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
4.2  How the reforms affected parental leave use 
As a start, it is illuminating to look at how the reforms affected parental leave use from 
different angles. Figure 1 starts by plotting the mean number of parental leave days 
(measured at the end of the calendar years three years after the birth-turn of the year) for 
different child birth month cohorts (December- or January-born children from different 16  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
years). This shows the development of parental leave over time. Clearly, fathers’ pa-
rental leave increased at both reform cutoffs, while mothers’ parental leave decreased 
only at the first reform cutoff. However, mothers with children born in January seem to 
always have used slightly fewer parental leave days, most likely because their children 
are on average one month younger when outcomes are measured. This small difference 
in child age does not seem to affect fathers’ parental leave during non-reform years. 
 
Figure 1 Mean parental leave for different child mob-cohorts 
Second,  Table  3  shows the results when parental leave days are regressed onto 
reform exposure status with and without control variables (i.e. the DDD model (4) 
above but with mothers’ and fathers’ days on parental leave instead of earnings as de-
pendent variable). Clearly, the reforms effectively increased fathers’ leave by around 9-
10 days each, and the first reform decreased mothers’ leave by almost 26 days. The 
reform coefficients do not change much when control variables are added, which indi-
cates that the reforms were exogenous to the parents. However,  this issue is more 
deeply investigated in the Section 4.3 below. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  17 
It is also interesting to investigate if there are heterogeneous responses to the reform, i.e. 
to examine the compliers. Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix show the reform effects 
for subgroups with different levels of maternal and paternal education. Although the 
patterns are not so clear it does seem like both reforms had relatively smaller effects on 
fathers’ leave among families with a low maternal level of education. 
Table 3 The effect of the reforms on parental leave use 
  Mothers’ days  Mothers’ days  Fathers’ days  Fathers’ days 
 
REFORM 
Panel a) First reform sample 
-25.304**  -25.792**  10.144*  10.025* 
  9.383  9.352  4.075  4.046 
Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R2  0.905  0.905  0.595  0.602 
F  9537.692  3222.543  537.277  190.664 
N  18014  18014  18014  18014 
 
REFORM 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
3.522  1.537  8.444*  9.019* 
  8.910  8.817  4.289  4.213 
Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R2  0.899  0.901  0.648  0.660 
F  8188.341  2822.574  859.009  305.184 
N  16602  16602  16602  16602 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
 
Next, we take a closer look at the behavior around the reform cutoffs. Figure 2 
shows the timing of parental leave for mothers and fathers in the reform cohorts (Janu-
ary 1995 versus December 1994 and January 2002 versus December 2001). More spe-
cifically, it shows the number of parental leave days each month during the child’s first 
6 years of life. Note that parental leave days from younger siblings show up in this fig-
ure since the parents get additional leave entitlements for each child. 
Clearly, most days are used before the child turns two years old. For mothers, there 
are no clear seasonal patterns and no differences between the January (solid) and De-
cember (dashed) group except that the graph for January-mothers in the first reform 
sample lies  slightly below the graph for December-mothers, a natural result of the 
reform. For fathers, we may note several interesting features. First, the graph for the 
January group mostly lies above that for the December group, which indicates that the 
January group indeed used more parental leave. Second, there are clear seasonal trends 
– fathers seem to use more parental leave during holidays, primarily during the sum-
mers but also in connection with Christmas and New Year. That is also the most likely 18  IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings 
explanation for the small difference in timing between January and December groups – 
fathers in the January group are on parental leave slightly earlier and this may be be-
cause of the timing of holiday breaks. Apart from that, the differences between Decem-
ber and January groups are small. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the distribution of the amount of parental leave for January 
(solid) and December (dashed) group, respectively. (In this figure, parental leave is 
measured up to child age three – the variation that is used in the main analysis - but 
looking at longer run parental leave does not change the overall picture). For the first 
reform sample, the distribution of fathers’ days is clearly shifted to the right as a result 
of the reform, with a new peak at around 30 days. The distribution of mothers’ days is 
likewise shifted to the left (the peaks for mothers are located at or slightly below the 
maximum available days on benefits, with and without the flat rate days). In this pic-
ture, the second reform does not seem to have affected mothers’ distribution of leave, 
but fathers’ leave was again shifted to the right with a new peak at 60 days.  
 
Figure 2 The timing of parental leave for reform cohorts by child month-of birth (December/January)  
 
 
Figure 3 The distribution of parental leave days for reform cohorts by child month-of birth (December/January) 
Note: for visibility, the graph is cut at the one-child maximum of 450 days; however, a smaller amount of parents have used slightly more days than this since they had another 
child before the first child turned three. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  21 
4.3  Exogeneity of reform exposure 
The parental leave reforms in 1995 and 2002 are used as exogenous sources of variation 
in order to estimate the causal effect of parental leave on earnings. This identification 
strategy requires that a) no other change, affecting treatment and control groups diffe-
rently, occurs at the same point in time as the reforms, and b) there is no endogenous 
sorting at the reform thresholds. 
Regarding (a), are the reforms the single changes affecting January and December 
groups differently? Again, there were other changes in the social security system passed 
the 1
st of January in 1995 and 2002, but they generally affected both groups equally. 
Only the daddy-month introduction along with some smaller changes in the reimburse-
ment rate for the transferable days (not the daddy-month) was tied to the birth date of 
the child. 
Regarding (b), is there any endogenous sorting at the reform thresholds? We start by 
investigating static sorting, although it is worth noting that fixed individual characteris-
tics are allowed to be correlated with the probability of reform exposure (the individual 
fixed effects are differenced out; see Section 3 above). However, if there are static sort-
ing it is also possible that there are sorting in terms of time-varying variables as well. 
The first reform gave incentives for parents to induce an earlier birth, both to avoid 
the daddy month restriction and because of the slightly higher replacement rate for 
children born before 1995. The second reform reversely gave incentives to postpone 
birth since the parental leave rules were strictly better for children born after the reform. 
These incentives may have caused informed parents to fine-tune delivery. Are there 
such indications? 
The first reform was difficult to anticipate at the time of conception. Although the 
daddy-month debate had been going on for years, it was unclear whether, when and how 
it should be implemented. As late as the 26
th of April, 1994, three parties from the go-
verning coalition threatened to vote against any such proposal (Karlsson, 1994a) and the 
reform proposition was not passed until 30
th of May, 1994 (Karlsson, 1994b) when the 
turn of the year babies 1994/1995 were already conceived. Even so, parents could of 
course plan an earlier birth just in case. In addition, although the exact natural birth date 
is a random process it is in principle possible to induce an earlier birth by medical  
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means, for example by using a caesarian section. The second reform had been known 
long in advance (TT, 2001) and informed parents may have chosen to postpone child-
bearing. 
Since there may be room for sorting around the reform cutoffs, we investigate this is-
sue a little deeper. First, Figure 4 below plots the number of first births in December 
and January over time. There clearly seem to be large variations over time, and possibly 
some tendencies of sorting in the anticipated direction – the difference in births between 
January and December are relatively small in 1994/1995 and slightly larger in 
2001/2002. However, such tendencies exist also at other points in time. In 1999/2000, 
for example, the difference is even smaller than in 1994/1995. 
 
Figure 4 Number of first births in December and January over time 
Next, we investigate whether observables can explain treatment status. This may 
show if there are indications of endogenous sorting at the reform cutoffs or if the pattern 
in Figure 3 above is merely the result of random variation. (Of course, there could be 
endogenous sorting that does not show up in terms of observables, but that is impossible 
to investigate). Table 4 shows regression results when an indicator variable for being 
exposed to the reform is regressed onto some arguably exogenous covariates (i.e. model IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  23 
(4) above but where the outcome variable is REFORM status and this is regressed onto 
all other fixed effects and the control variables). 
Clearly, there are no statistically significant differences in parental characteristics
9 
between children born in January and December and all point estimates are small in 
magnitude
10
Next, we investigate the more important issue, if there seems to be time-variant 
sorting. In particular, we do not want reform exposure to be correlated with income 
shocks. Instead, January and December groups should follow the same wage growth 
paths over time. 
. However, even if each single coefficient is statistically non-significant, 
they could have explanatory power together. In fact, F-tests between these models and 
similar models without control variables (only the fixed effects for cohort, time, month-
of-birth and their pairwise interactions are included) returns test statistics of 2.77 (first 
reform sample) and 2.58 (second reform sample) which is statistically significant and 
rejects the null hypothesis that the added control variables have no explanatory power. 
So, there may be some static sorting in terms of observable characteristics. This sug-
gests that there could also be sorting in terms of unobservables. However, as noted 
above, static sorting is in itself not problematic (since we have panel data and can esti-
mate the family fixed effects). 
Table 5 investigates this issue by regressing the probability of reform 
exposure (being born in January around the reform cutoff) on the fixed effects, the con-
trol variables and different earnings lags (maternal and paternal earnings two and three 
years before the birth of the child). This is necessarily done on a slightly smaller sample 
since these earnings lags are not available for all individuals. At most, we lose 74 indi-
viduals from the first reform sample and 75 individuals from the second reform sample. 
Clearly, none of the earnings lags are statistically significant and they are also small in 
magnitude. Hence, the groups exposed to the reforms seem to follow the same earnings 
pattern over time as the comparison groups. 
                                                 
9 See also Ekberg et. al. (2005) who compare the number of births each day around the turn of the year 1994/1995 
and other years and find no systematic pattern. In addition, they compare parental age distributions for children born 
two weeks before and after the reform and find no evidence of differences in parental characteristics. 
10 All variables except the child gender variable are measured prior to the birth of the child.  
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Table 4 The effect of exogenous characteristics on prob(reform exposure) 
  First reform  Second reform 
Mother’s lnE   (-0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Father’s lnE   0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Father's age  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Mother's age  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Father w. high school educ.  -0.012  0.003 
  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Mother w. high school educ.  0.011  0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Father w. university educ.  -0.000  0.015 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Mother w. university educ.  0.005  -0.012 
  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Married  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Son  -0.005  -0.003 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
R2  0.857  0.872 
F  1031.9  1329.9 
N  18014  16602 
Notes: All variables (except child gender) are measured one year before the birth of the child. Significance levels: * 
10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  25 
 











Mother’s lnE, lag2 
Panel a) First reform sample 
-0.001       
  (0.002)       
Mother’s lnE, lag3    -0.000     
    (0.002)     
Father’s lnE, lag2      0.002   
      (0.001)   
Father’s lnE, lag3        0.001 
        (0.001) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.857  0.857  0.857  0.857 
F  1110.1  1089.9  1114.3  1111.0 
N  17970  17866  17998  17970 
 
Mother’s lnE, lag2 
Panel b). Second reform sample 
0.002       
  (0.001)       
Mother’s lnE, lag3    0.001     
    (0.001)     
Father’s lnE, lag2      -0.000   
      (0.001)   
Father’s lnE, lag3        -0.000 
        (0.001) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.872  0.872  0.872  0.872 
F  1429.7  1403.4  1434.8  1427.8 
N  16522  16452  16565  16533 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
 
4.4  Preview of results – simple cross-tabulations 
Without control variables, the REFORM-coefficient in the difference-in-differences 
(DD) and triple differences (DDD) models can be calculated as simple differences be-
tween group means. Table 6 and Table 7 below shows these estimates for mothers and 
fathers; both estimates are also shown for different placebo years and the DDD-esti-
mates are calculated using different comparison years. For ease of exposition, standard 
errors are omitted but as will be clear from Section 5.1 the standard errors are indeed 
huge and none of the differences below are statistically significant. 
The first reform increased mothers’ subsequent earnings by 9 percent using the DD 
approach and by 10-15 percent using the DDD approach with different comparison 
years. Hence, it is a sizeable positive effect of the first reform on mothers’ earnings, and 
the point estimate also seems robust to different comparison years. In addition, the DD- 
and DDD-estimates from different placebo years are all much smaller and mostly of the  
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reverse sign, which further indicates that the reform indeed had an effect on maternal 
subsequent earnings. However, turning to the second reform, the results are less robust. 
The coefficients from DD and DDD-models vary in both sign and size (from -5 percent 
using the DD model to between 1 and 11 percent using DDD-models) and the result are 
not very different from estimates in different pre-reform placebo years. 
This could indicate that it is mothers’ own leave (which was affected by the first but 
not the second reform) that is important. (Another possible story is that there could be 
differences in parental leave timing between the reforms. Potentially the first reform in-
duced fathers to take more “non-holiday” parental leave, since otherwise the total ex-
pected leave was reduced, while the second reform was less strict in the sense that the 
families were given an additional month of leave, implying that fathers could more 
freely choose the timing of the parental leave. If so, and if “holiday”-parental leave is 
less helpful for maternal labor market behavior, this could explain the difference in ef-
fects between the first and second reform.) 
Regarding the fathers, both reforms seem to have had a negative effect on subsequent 
earnings. The first reform’s estimates range from -18 to -34 percent, indeed huge effects 
but suprisingly robust to the choice of comparison year and also more negative than any 
of the pre-reform placebo estimates. The second reform’s estimates are much smaller, -5 
to 5 percent, and also quite similar to the pre-reform placebo estimates. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  27 
 







1  Reform cohort 
 
  

















LnE at t=0  11,21  11,20  11,11  11,05  10,96  11,00  10,65  10,50 
LnE at t=4  9,29  9,24  9,39  9,32  9,49  9,48  9,64  9,57 
Diff  -1,93  -1,96  -1,72  -1,73  -1,47  -1,53  -1,02  -0,93 
DD estimate    -0,03    -0,01    -0,06    0,09 
DDD estimate1        0,02    -0,05    0,15 
DDD estimate2            -0,03    0,10 
DDD estimate3                0,12 
 
  

















LnE at t=0  10,65  10,65  10,93  10,95  11,08  11,05  11,25  11,31 
LnE at t=4  10,16  10,00  10,22  10,18  10,18  10,01  10,06  10,07 
Diff  -0,49  -0,65  -0,71  -0,77  -0,91  -1,05  -1,19  -1,24 
DD estimate    -0,16    -0,06    -0,14    -0,05 
DDD estimate1        0,10    -0,08    0,09 
DDD estimate2            0,02    0,01 
DDD estimate3                0,11 
 







1  Reform cohort 
 
  
Panel a) First reform sample 
Dec 91  Jan 92  Dec 92  Jan 93  Dec 93  Jan 94  Dec 94  Jan 95 
LnE at t=0  11,21  11,24  11,14  11,15  10,87  10,82  10,39  10,55 
LnE at t=4  10,98  11,10  11,04  11,10  11,18  11,05  11,26  11,18 
Diff  -0,24  -0,14  -0,10  -0,04  0,30  0,24  0,88  0,63 
DD estimate    0,09    0,06    -0,07    -0,24 
DDD estimate1        -0,04    -0,12    -0,18 
DDD estimate2            -0,16    -0,30 
DDD estimate3                -0,34 
 
  
Panel b) Second reform sample 
Dec 98  Jan 99  Dec 99  Jan 00  Dec 00  Jan 01  Dec 01  Jan 02 
LnE at t=0  10,93  10,91  11,05  11,16  11,29  11,34  11,51  11,38 
LnE at t=4  11,58  11,48  11,46  11,59  11,50  11,58  11,68  11,53 
Diff  0,64  0,57  0,42  0,43  0,21  0,24  0,17  0,15 
DD estimate    -0,07    0,01    0,03    -0,02 
DDD estimate1        0,09    0,01    -0,05 
DDD estimate2            0,10    -0,04 
DDD estimate3                          0,05  
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5  Results 
5.1  Main results 
Table 8 and show estimation results for mothers and fathers for the first and second 
reform sample separately and using the different models (cross-section, fixed effects, 
DD and DDD). 
There are several things to note. First, there are clear differences between the cross-
sectional model and the fixed-effects model, which suggest selection of families into 
different levels of parental leave usage. Second, using the fixed-effects model, own pa-
rental leave do seem to reduce subsequent earnings – each month of own parental leave 
lowers mothers’ earnings by 4.5 percent (in the first reform sample) and fathers’ earn-
ings by around 7.5 percent. The magnitude of these effects is far larger than previous 
studies – for example, Albrecht et al (1999) found wage reductions of 0.1-0.5 percent 
for each month of parental leave. This can be explained by the fact that here, annual 
earnings are used which reflect both wages and hours worked, while most previous stu-
dies have focused on wages. In addition, our focus is on the relatively short run effect 
on earnings four years later, when some parents could still be on parental leave (and pa-
rental leave up to child age 3 may be correlated with later parental leave). In addition, 
the longer-run effects are usually found to be smaller due to rebound effects and catch-
ing-up of human capital. 
The differences in effects between males and females could be due to nonlinearities, 
if the first months of leave are more important for earnings than later parental leave. It 
could also be a signaling effect. As suggested by Albrecht et al (1999), parental leave 
could have a stronger signaling value for males since so few fathers stay on parental 
leave compared to virtually all mothers. 
Third, and more interesting, spousal parental leave has no effect on father’s earnings 
but do seem important for mother’s labor market behavior. Each additional month that 
the father stays on parental leave increases mothers’ earnings by 6.7 percent in the first 
reform sample (the effect in the second reform sample is not statistically significant). 
This is a large effect, even larger than the effect of a mother’s own parental leave. This 
indicates that paternal (lack of) involvement in parental leave and child care may in fact IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  29 
be one important explanation for the male-to-female earnings gap. Another story could 
be a “reverse signaling” story – while most mothers take all available parental leave, a 
shorter period of leave could work as a positive signal of work-commitment. 
These causal interpretations rest on the assumption of no time-variant unobserved 
heterogeneity, and in particular that fertility and parental leave is not endogenous. For 
example, if parents who experience an income shock becomes more (less) likely to have 
children and/or stay on parental leave, this assumption is clearly violated. Using the re-
forms as exogenous variation in parental leave do, unfortunately, yield very imprecise 
estimates that are not statistically different from zero. We can note, however, that this is 
not because of a weak effect on parental leave use. As we saw in Section 4.2, the reform 
effectively changed the parents’ time on parental leave. Instead, it could be that the 
normal-year variation in earnings depending on child birth dates is too large to enable 
precise estimation. 
However, we may still make some comparisons of the point estimates across models. 
The tables also report the predicted reform effect for the CS/FE-models, which is a cal-
culation of the predicted effect of the reform if the assumptions underlying the CS or FE 
models are fulfilled. This effect is calculated as the mean change in mothers’ and fa-
thers’ time on parental leave as induced by the reforms (see the reform-coefficient from 
Table 2 above, columns 2 and 4), multiplied by the coefficient on each month of leave 
as estimated by the CS/FE models.
11
For example, if the fixed-effects results are true, we would expect the first reform to 
increase maternal earnings by 6.1 percent; both because of the decrease in own leave 
and because of the increase in spousal leave. This effect is well within the 95 percent 
confidence interval of both models using the reform as exogenous variation. The most 
flexible model, DDD, tentatively suggests even larger effects – the point estimate is 
14.9, albeit very imprecisely estimated. The same pattern is found also for the second 
reform sample and among fathers – model (4) always returns larger point estimates than 
model (2). This tentatively suggests that the “true” effect is in the same range or larger  
 
                                                 
11 The standard error of this estimate is calculated assuming that the underlying variables are independent random 
variables.  
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than suggested by the fixed-effects specification. 
Finally, we can note that these estimates are quite similar to the estimates without 
control variables (see the cross-tabulations above), which further indicates that the re-
forms are indeed exogenous. 
Table 8 The effect of parental leave on mothers’ earnings at child age 4 
  CS  FE  DD  DDD 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
-0.011  -0.045***     
  (0.009)  (0.013)     
Father's PL  0.021  0.067*     
  (0.019)  (0.029)     
REFORM  [0.017]  [0.061]  0.088  0.149 
  [0.011]  [0.023]  (0.176)  (0.244) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.059  0.656  0.667  0.655 
F  40.717  45.833  17.038  41.939 
N  9007  18014  8704  18014 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
0.026**  -0.023     
  (0.010)  (0.014)     
Father's PL  0.034  0.036     
  (0.022)  (0.030)     
REFORM  [0.011]  [0.010]  -0.041  0.102 
  [0.012]  [0.014]  (0.164)  (0.236) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.047  0.683  0.688  0.683 
F  29.497  41.427  25.744  37.474 
N  8301  16602  8558  16602 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  31 
 
Table 9 The effect of parental leave on fathers’ earnings at child age 4. 
  CS  FE  DD  DDD 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
0.013  0.000     
  (0.007)  (0.011)     
Father's PL  0.035  -0.076**     
  (0.019)  (0.027)     
REFORM  [0.000]  [-0.025]  -0.256  -0.186 
  [0.011]  [0.018]  (0.165)  (0.221) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.058  0.706  0.706  0.706 
F  39.912  11.074  10.795  11.139 
N  9007  18014  8704  18014 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
0.007  0.005     
  (0.008)  (0.012)     
Father's PL  0.010  -0.075**     
  (0.020)  (0.026)     
REFORM  [0.003]  [-0.022]  -0.050  -0.074 
  [0.007]  [0.014]  (0.138)  (0.206) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.047  0.714  0.731  0.713 
F  25.454  3.860  2.125  3.031 
N  8301  16602  8558  16602 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
 
5.2  Robustness: other specifications 
In the main analysis above, the dependent variable is defined as log(earnings+1) to in-
clude also individuals who do not participate in the labor market. As discussed above, 
this is not unproblematic and Table A3 and Table A4 in Appendix show alternative 
specifications for the effect of parental leave/the reforms on the probability of having 
nonzero earnings (the extensive margin) and on log earnings among those with earn-
ings>0, using the FE or DDD models. 
The effect of parental leave on the participation decision is mostly not statistically 
significant, but the effect on log earnings among those with earnings >0 follow the same 
pattern as above – a negative effect of own parental leave and, for mothers, a positive 
effect of spousal leave in the second reform sample. The magnitudes of the effects are, 
as expected, smaller since now zero observations are excluded and part of the effect in  
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the main analysis above was driven by individuals with zero earnings. Again, the DDD 
model returns only imprecisely estimated effects. 
12
6  Extensions 
 
6.1  Heterogeneous effects 
Usually, career interruptions are believed to be more harmful for individuals in occupa-
tions requiring a high level of human capital input. Therefore, we may hypothesize that 
both own and spousal parental leave is more important for parents with a high level of 
education. Also, as we saw above, the responsiveness to the reforms differed slightly 
between groups. However, estimating the models (FE/DDD) separately for subgroups 
with different maternal and paternal levels of education yields mostly imprecisely esti-
mated effects that are not significantly different between the groups. This is most likely 
because of the smaller sample sizes in the FE case. 
6.2  The effect of non-holiday parental leave 
If there is an effect of fathers’ leave on mothers’ labor market behavior, one might hy-
pothesize that this effect should differ depending on the timing of this leave. In particu-
lar, the great flexibility of the Swedish parental leave (remember that the days can be 
used until the child turns eight years old) also means that parents can use parental leave 
instead of ordinary vacation, for example during summertime or around Christmas. 
Such parental leave is potentially less helpful for mothers’ careers than parental leave 
used when the other spouse is working. 
Table 10 shows the effect of non-holiday parental leave, which is defined as parental 
leave excluding leave in June, July or August. This is estimated using the fixed-effects 
specification (model 2). Indeed, and in line with the hypothesis, non-holiday parental 
leave seems to have a larger negative effect on own earnings than summertime leave, 
and father’s non-holiday leave has a larger positive effect on maternal earnings than  
                                                 
12 In addition, using the models above (eq. 1-4) with earnings in levels (SEK, including zeroes) instead of in logs 
yields similar results as when earnings in logs are used, which indicates that the results are not sensitive to the 
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leave including summertime leave. For example, fathers’ non-holiday leave increases 
maternal earnings by almost 10 percent in the first reform sample (compared to 6.7 per-
cent for all types of parental leave; see Table 8). 
Table 10 The effect of non-holiday parental leave 
  FE: Effects on lnE mothers  FE: Effects on lnE fathers 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
-0.056***  0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.015) 
Father's PL  0.098**  -0.092** 
  (0.037)  (0.035) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
REFORM  [0.081]  [-0.033] 
  [0.030]  [0.022] 
R2  0.656  0.706 
F  46.074  11.091 
N  18014  18014 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
-0.030  0.005 
  (0.018)  (0.016) 
Father's PL  0.057  -0.088** 
  (0.036)  (0.032) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
REFORM  [0.016]  [-0.026] 
  [0.018]  [0.017] 
R2  0.683  0.714 
F  41.581  3.785 
N  16602  16602 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
6.3  Other outcomes: fertility and marital/cohabitation status 
A more equally shared parental leave could affect other outcomes than earnings. For ex-
ample, previous studies have found that the amount of gender equality within a family 
may affect (increase) both fertility and marital happiness (Cooke 2004; Coltrane, 2000; 
De Laat and  Sevilla Sanz, 2006; Nilsson, 2008; Oláh; 2003; Sacerdote and Feyrer, 
2008; Torr and Short, 2004). 
Table 11 and Table 12 below show the effects of parental leave/the reforms on fertil-
ity and cohabitant/marital status, at child age 4. Since we focus on first-born children, 
the number of siblings is always zero before the child is born; hence, in the siblings re-
gression we cannot make within family comparisons over time. Therefore, results are 
shown for the cross-sectional model and for a “horizontal” DD-model, where the num-
ber of siblings is compared across cohort and month-of-birth (instead of across time and  
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month of birth in the standard DD-model). For the regressions on cohabitant/marital 
status, the FE and DDD-specifications are used. 
Clearly, and in line with previous studies, both mothers’ and fathers’ parental leave 
have positive effects on fertility and the probability of cohabiting and being married. 
The coefficients in the cross-sectional and fixed-effects models are always statistically 
significant and very close in magnitude over time (first versus second reform sample). 
This suggests ambiguous expected effects of the first reform since it decreased mothers’ 
leave while increasing fathers’ leave, and positive effects of the second reform. Turning 
to the DD/DDD models, the results are again imprecisely estimated, but the point esti-
mates for fertility are quite close to the predicted effects as suggested by the CS model. 
Table 11 Effects on fertility (no. of younger siblings) 
  CS  DD-variant 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
0.057***   
  (0.001)   
Father's PL  0.065***   
  (0.002)   
REFORM  [-0.028]  -0.022 
  [0.020]  (0.022) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.328  0.032 
F  382.805  27.570 
N  9007  9007 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
0.052***   
  (0.001)   
Father's PL  0.055***   
  (0.002)   
REFORM  [0.019]  0.011 
  [0.017]  (0.023) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.272  0.057 
F  272.253  45.510 
N  8301  8301 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  35 
 
Table 12 Effects on cohabitant/marital status 
  Prob(cohabiting)  Prob(married) 
  FE  DDD  FE  DDD 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
0.010***    0.010***   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
Father's PL  0.016***    0.018***   
  (0.002)    (0.003)   
REFORM  [-0.003]  -0.016  [-0.003]  -0.008 
  [0.004]  (0.021)  [0.004]  (0.025) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.878  0.875  0.794  0.791 
F  2017.344  1653.074  179.212  160.217 
N  18014  18014  18014  18014 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
0.008***    0.009***   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
Father's PL  0.016***    0.020***   
  (0.002)    (0.003)   
REFORM  [0.005]  -0.011  [0.007]  -0.028 
  [0.003]  (0.019)  [0.004]  (0.026) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.905  0.903  0.809  0.806 
F  2897.678  2408.354  151.733  135.382 
N  16602  16602  16602  16602 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
7  Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the effect of parental leave on earnings. In contrast to most pre-
vious studies, not only own but also spousal parental leave is considered, under the hy-
pothesis that spousal help in child care may feed back onto each individual’s labor mar-
ket behavior. 
Using a fixed effects model to account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, 
the results show that own parental leave is associated with earnings reductions of 4.5 
percent for mothers and 7.5 percent for fathers. In terms of sign, this is in line with pre-
vious studies. The size of the effects is much larger than in previous studies, partly be-
cause the focus here is on annual earnings (which also reflect hours worked) as com-
pared to wages, which is mostly used in other studies. 
For mothers, also spousal parental leave is important for future earnings. Each month 
that the father stays on parental leave increases maternal earnings by 6.7 percent, which 
is an even larger effect than the mother’s own leave. This suggests that paternal (lack  
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of) involvement in child care and parental leave could be one factor behind the remain-
ing, unexplained earnings gap. Among fathers, there is no effect of spousal parental 
leave on earnings. Even larger effects of fathers’ leave on maternal earnings can be 
found if we restrict focus to “non-holiday” parental leave, i.e. parental leave excluding 
leave during the summer (June, July, or August). Such parental leave may be a better 
measure of spousal help than parental leave during summertime (when both spouses 
may be at home simultaneously because of ordinary vacation). 
Finally, the fixed-effects model rests on the assumption of no unobserved, time-va-
riant heterogeneity. In particular, it assumes that parental leave is unaffected by for ex-
ample income shocks. If this assumption is violated, we need some kind of exogenous 
variation to identify causal effects. The two daddy-month reforms in 1995 and 2002 had 
a strong effect on parental leave usage. Despite that, using the reforms as exogenous 
variation in parental leave yields only very imprecise estimates. This is most likely due 
to large random variation in earnings depending on child birth dates. However, the point 
estimates from DD and DDD models tentatively suggests effects in the same range or 
larger than what was found using the fixed-effects specification. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  37 
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Appendix 
A1 Additional tables 





















Panel a) First reform sample 
-40.484  -6.606  -31.210**  12.231*  -7.434  12.772 
  (29.238)  (13.599)  (12.074)  (4.930)  (17.149)  (7.954) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.897  0.557  0.908  0.596  0.904  0.627 
F  408.557  15.586  2386.775  126.709  1081.300  89.595 
N  2114  2114  10754  10754  5146  5146 
 
REFORM 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
-2.458  -4.087  2.506  13.550*  1.821  6.070 
  (30.748)  (15.297)  (12.454)  (5.301)  (13.616)  (7.256) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.885  0.609  0.904  0.643  0.902  0.686 
F  292.824  21.625  1822.531  165.912  1289.197  182.773 
N  1730  1730  8606  8606  6266  6266 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
 





















Panel a) First reform sample 
-2.510  13.989  -35.413**  9.492  -16.395  9.721 
  (27.176)  (12.088)  (11.905)  (5.106)  (18.059)  (7.803) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.896  0.574  0.909  0.594  0.903  0.632 
F  476.991  22.888  2390.505  121.930  1016.760  86.887 
N  2470  2470  10654  10654  4890  4890 
 
REFORM 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
4.451  7.799  2.431  6.844  1.156  12.650 
  (27.334)  (12.110)  (11.468)  (5.389)  (16.488)  (8.178) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.900  0.616  0.905  0.642  0.894  0.695 
F  371.289  27.823  2122.051  191.315  911.531  151.987 
N  1826  1826  9846  9846  4930  4930 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family.  
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Table A3 Robustness, mothers 
  Prob(earnings>0)  LnE given earnings>0 
  FE  DDD  FE  DDD 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
-0.003*    -0.017***   
  (0.001)    (0.005)   
Father's PL  0.004    0.024   
  (0.003)    (0.014)   
REFORM  [0.004]  0.016  [0.022]  -0.031 
  [0.002]  (0.022)  [0.009]  (0.096) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.609  0.609  0.677  0.677 
F  21.544  19.976  45.538  41.773 
N  18014  18014  16306  16306 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
-0.001    -0.011*   
  (0.001)    (0.005)   
Father's PL  -0.002    0.061***   
  (0.003)    (0.011)   
REFORM  [-0.001]  0.007  [0.018]  0.032 
  [0.001]  (0.021)  [0.010]  (0.092) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.639  0.640  0.689  0.684 
F  18.358  16.724  46.653  39.258 
N  16602  16602  15239  15239 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. 
 
Table A4 Robustness, fathers 
  Prob(earnings>0)  LnE given earnings>0 
  FE  DDD  FE  DDD 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel a) First reform sample 
0.000    -0.001   
  (0.001)    (0.003)   
Father's PL  -0.004    -0.028**   
  (0.002)    (0.009)   
REFORM  [-0.002]  -0.023  [-0.009]  0.074 
  [0.001]  (0.019)  [0.006]  (0.065) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.658  0.659  0.769  0.769 
F  1.691  2.227  72.935  68.220 
N  18014  18014  16530  16530 
 
Mother's PL 
Panel b) Second reform sample 
0.001    -0.004   
  (0.001)    (0.003)   
Father's PL  -0.003    -0.045***   
  (0.002)    (0.008)   
REFORM  [-0.001]  -0.005  [-0.014]  -0.021 
  [0.001]  (0.017)  [0.007]  (0.061) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.676  0.675  0.748  0.746 
F  1.199  0.770  41.415  35.490 
N  16602  16602  15570  15570 
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on family. IFAU – The effect of own and spousal parental leave on earnings  43 
A2 The timing of variable collection 
Figure A1 shows the timing of variable collection. All variables are collected at two 
points in time: one year before the birth of the child (for notational convenience this is 
called t=0 although it in practice means t=-1) and also at child age four (t=4). However, 
as is clear from the picture, this is average child ages. Since the variables are measured 
the 31
st of December each year, this will mean that children born in January will on av-
erage be one month younger than children born in December when the variables are 
collected. 
The parental leave variables are measured as the cumulative amount of parental leave 
up to child age three. The motivation is that it is not very interesting to estimate the di-
rect effect of parental leave today on earnings today. Rather, the interesting relationship 






B: yob=1995  
(Jan) 
Controls collected in Dec 
1993 for A & B (t=0) 
Dependent variables 
measured in Dec 1998 for 
A & B (t=4) 
1993  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Special case: PL is measured 
up to Dec 1997 for A & B 
Figure A1 The timing of variable collection: example for reform cohort, first reform 
sample  
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A3 Details of the parental leave benefits over the years 



















1990  360  90  222750  549  60  90  60 
1991  360  90  241500  595  60  90  60 
1992  360  90  252750  623  60  90  60 
1993  360  90  258000  636  60  90  60 
1994
a  360  90  264000  651  64  90/0  60/0 
1995
b  360  80  267750  587  60  90  60 
1996
c  360  75  271500  558  60  90  60 
1997  360  75  272250  559  60  90  60 
1998  360  80  273000  598  60  90  60 
1999  360  80  273000  598  60  90  60 
2000  360  80  274500  602  60  90  60 
2001  360  80  276750  607  60  90  60 
2002
d  390  80  284250  623  120  90  60 
2003  390  80  289500  635  150  90  60 
2004  390  80  294750  646  180  90  60 
2005  390  80  295500  648  180  90  60 
2006 (to 
June 30)  390  80  297750  653  180  90  60 
2006 (from 
July 1)  390  80  397000  870  180  90  180 
2007  390  80  398567  874  180  90  180 
2008  390  80  397700  872  180  90  180 
2009  390  80  415160  910  180  90  180 
Notes: a) During the second half of 1994, the flat rate days were temporarily abolished for children >1 year old.  
b) The first "daddy month" was introduced for children born after the 1st of january, 1995. During the 30 days set 
aside for each parent (the daddy month), the reimbursement level for the SGI days was still 90% of previous income.  
c) During the 30 days set aside for each parent (the daddy month), the reimbursement level for the SGI days was still 
85% of previous income.  
d) The second "daddy month" was introduced for children born after the 1st of january, 2002. 
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